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STARE DECISIS IN LOWER COURTS:
PREDICTING THE DEMISE OF SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT
The proposition that lower federal courts must follow Supreme Court
precedent evokes little controversy. The hierarchical inferiority of the
lower federal courts and the doctrine of stare decisis combine to impose a
seemingly exceptionless rule of deference to the Supreme Court. But the
contours of this rule are not well-defined. Lower courts occasionally de-
cline to follow Supreme Court precedent, even while purporting to follow
the Court.
A recent federal court case prompts a fresh examination of the lower
courts' duty to follow Supreme Court dictates. In McCray v. Abrams, 1 a
federal district court held that racially motivated peremptory challenges
offend the equal protection clause. 2 In so holding, the court refused to
follow an eighteen year old Supreme Court decision, Swain v. Alabama.3
1. 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
2. Id. at 1249. The court's reliance on the equal protection clause was not unequivocal. Relying
on Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the court also intimated that discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges violates the sixth amendment requirement that juries be selected from a fair
cross-section of the community. 576 F. Supp. at 1247-48. Barring discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges on sixth amendment grounds is dubious, however, because the Supreme Court has applied
the fair cross-section requirement only to jury pools and venires, never to petit juries. In fact, Taylor
expressly cautioned against extending the fair cross-section requirement to petit juries. Taylor, 419
U.S. at 538.
3. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). In Swain, the Court held that racially motivated peremptory challenges
in any particular case do not constitute a constitutional violation. Id. at 221. However, the Court
opined in dicta that a cause of action may exist where the prosecution has systematically excluded
minorities from juries by peremptory challenges over a period of time. Id. at 223-24. ,
If the McCray court's alternative sixth amendment ground is valid, see supra note 2, McCray is not
necessarily characterized as refusing to follow Swain. The Supreme Court did not hold the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial applicable to the states until three years after the Court decided Swain,
an equal protection case. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). But since the equal protection
clause is the more plausible ground for prohibiting racially motivated peremptory challenges, and
since the court in McCray believed its holding unjustified if Swain were still "good law," 576 F.
Supp. at 1246, this Comment treats McCray as resting on the equal protection clause and thus repudi-
ating Swain.
There is abundant literature advocating the prohibition of racially motivated challenges. See, e.g.,
Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 283-303 (1968); Comment,
The Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutional Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L.
REv. 1770 (1979); Comment, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit
Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977) (advocating recognition of a sixth amendment cause of action). But
see, Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Betveen Impartiality and Group
Representation, 41 MD. L. Rv. 337 (1982) (defending the Swain rule). Several state courts have
held that racially motivated peremptory challenges violate their state constitutions. See, e.g., People
v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares,
377 Mass. 461,387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
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The McCray defendant had exhausted his appeals for a robbery convic-
tion, 4 and the United States Supreme Court denied a hearing on this con-
viction. 5 In denying certiorari, however, the Supreme Court appended
two opinions. One, a dissent from the certiorari denial joined by two Jus-
tices, expressed a dissatisfaction with Swain and a desire to hear the
case. 6 The other, a concurrence joined by three Justices, acknowledged
the importance of the underlying issue, 7 but reasoned that the Supreme
Court should delay reconsideration to allow the arguments to fully de-
velop in other courts. 8 Following the denial of certiorari, the McCray de-
fendant brought a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. Relying
on the expressed willngness of five Justices to reconsider the issue, the
district court arrived at a result contrary to Swain. 9 The court in McCrav
thus repudiated a Supreme Court case that still possessed precedential au-
thority.
If McCray is sound, it implies that lower courts may refuse to follow an
authoritative Supreme Court precedent while still upholding their general
4. The trial court denied McCray's motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of invalid prose-
cutorial use of peremptories. People v. McCray. 104 Misc. 2d 782. 429 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Kings Co. 1980). The appellate division affirmed without opinion and the court of appeals again
affirmed the conviction in a four-to-three decision. 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d
441 (1982).
5. McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
6. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan. authored the dissent. The dissent avoided ex-
pressly stating that the Court should overrule Swain, but its criticism leaves little doubt that the dis-
senters would not follow Swain. Id. at 2440-41.
7. Id. at2438.
8. Id. Justices Blackmun and Powell joined the concurrence written by Justice Stevens. By its
terms, the six sentence concurrence took no position on the validity of racially motivated peremptory
challenges; it merely expressed the three Justices' interest in examining the issue at a later date. The
concurrence reasoned that since judicial review of peremptory challenges is a recent phenomenon.
the Court could make a more informed resolution of the issue after other courts addressed some of the
practical problems of such review.
As the District Court in McCrav noted, Justice Stevens' opinion is ambiguous regarding which
courts may experiment with judicial review of peremptory challenges. McCray v. Abrams. 576 F.
Supp. 1244, 1246 (1983). Stevens' opinion contains some language that a court could construe as
inviting federal as well as state courts to examine the issue, and other language apparently directing
the invitation exclusively to the states. 103 S. Ct. at 2438-39. State courts, of course. need no invita-
tion to find that criminal defendants enjoy greater rights under their state constitutions than under the
federal constitution.
The mere fact that the concurring Justices expressed a willingness to consider the issue, however.
casts doubt on Swain's continued vitality. This, combined with the concurrence's interest in solutions
to the practical problems associated with judicial review of peremptory challenges. indicates that
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Powell are disposed to determine the limits of such review rather
than reject it altogether by reaffirming Swain.
9. McCray. 576 F. Supp. at 1246. The court noted that "[i]t is unusual, to say the least, for a
district court to reexamine a Supreme Court case squarely on point." Id. Another unusual aspect of
McCrav is that the respondent, Kings County District Attorney, agreed with the petitioner that the
court should not follow Swain. Id.
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obligation to follow the Supreme Court. The question therefore arises,
whether and under what circumstances lower courts may disregard the
command of authoritative Supreme Court precedent directly on point
while not engaging in outright disobedience. 10
This Comment contends that under limited circumstances lower courts
may refuse to follow authoritative precedent. The Comment begins by
distinguishing the doctrine of stare decisis in the Supreme Court and the
doctrine as applied to lower courts. Next, the Comment discusses the
doctrine of implicit overrule and suggests that the concept of implicit
overrule is not sufficiently broad to encompass all of the circumstances in
which lower courts should be allowed to disregard precedent. Using
McCray as a paradigm, this Comment concludes that lower courts, within
narrow limits, should be free to disregard even authoritative precedent
when it is predictable that the Supreme Court would no longer follow the
precedent. "l
10. The "directly on point" limitation is important because that is where the force of precedent
in lower courts is strongest. The hypothesis throughout this Comment is that a precedent directly on
point, i.e., precedent that cannot be meaningfully distinguished, confronts a lower court. This limita-
tion isolates the impact of precedent on lower court outcomes, thereby preventing confusion between
a precedent not followed because it lacks authority, and one not followed because its authority in the
particular case is weakened by factual disanalogies. Since lower courts have no obligation to follow
precedents materially dissimilar to the case at bar, excluding dissimilarity as a consideration im-
proves analysis of whether lower courts may disregard Supreme Court precedent.
What is meant by "directly on point" is a question of considerable controversy; the question turns
on what it is about a precedent that lower courts must follow. See, e.g., Goodhart, Determining the
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930); Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND.
L.J. 41 (1979); Montrose, The Language of, and a Notation for, the Doctrine of Precedent, 2 U.W.
AUsTRALIA ANN. L. REv. 301 (1952). This Comment assumes that what courts follow in a precedent
is a rule containing two elements: (1) an antecedent, a generalized description of a fact pattern; and
(2) a consequence, the rights and liabilities that the law attaches to that pattern. Where the facts of a
case fall within the generalized description in the antecedent, the precedent is "directly on point."
The degree of generality in the antecedent is often at issue, and courts frequently distinguish pre-
cedents because the rules they stand for are not as generally applicable as one of the litigants con-
tends. As the facts of a case approach identity with the facts of a precedent, however, the precedent's
applicability is increasingly certain; and while no two cases are exactly alike, this Comment assumes
that there are cases where a precedent cannot be meaningfully distinguished on its facts.
This Comment also assumes that McCray is such a case. The facts in McCray and Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), were materially identical: deliberate exclusion of minorities from the
petit jury through the use of peremptory challenges. But the court in McCray found an equal protec-
tion violation; the Court in Swain did not.
11. The Comment discusses only methods by which lower courts can disregard precedent and
still "follow" the Supreme Court. Some lower courts, however, assert a power to disregard Supreme
Court precedent on the ground that the latter court has erred. See, e.g.. Jaffree v. Board of School
Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.), stayed, 103 S. Ct. 842, rev'd sub nom.
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983). In Jaffree, the district court upheld Alabama
statutes authorizing prayer in the public schools, in contravention of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962). After an independent review of the history surrounding the adoption of the first and four-
teenth amendments, the court found that the establishment clause was never meant to apply to the
states, and that "the United States Supreme Court has erred in its reading of history." 554 F. Supp.
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I. THE LOWER COURTS' MANDATORY OBLIGATION TO
FOLLOW SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Initially, stare decisis as it applies to the Supreme Court must be distin-
guished from the role of stare decisis in lower courts' decisionmaking.
The Supreme Court adheres to its own precedents as a matter of policy. '2
In its most thorough discussion of stare decisis, the Supreme Court in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines13 adopted a method for determining the
degree of deference properly accorded an unsound but controlling pre-
cedent. Deciding at the outset that it confronted erroneous precedent, the
Court stated that stare decisis promoted the policies of (1) certainty in the
law's application, (2) fairness and efficiency in the administration of jus-
tice, and (3) maintenance of public confidence in judges as impersonal
decisionmakers.14 The Court then considered the impact that overruling
the particular precedent would have on each policy. 15 Finding none of the
at 1128. Aside from the question of whether the court in Jaffree was right about the establishment
clause's intended application to the states, the validity of the district court's action depends upon the
extent to which it is possible for the Supreme Court to "err," or whether Supreme Court holdings are
law simply because the Court so held. Such questions are beyond the scope of this Comment. It
should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has declared that lower courts may not decline to
follow Supreme Court holdings thought to be erroneous: "[A] precedent of this Court must be fol-
lowed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to
be." Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982).
12. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) (quoting
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
The Court has traditionally exercised considerable freedom in overruling constitutional decisions.
since normal legislative processes cannot correct these errors. Smith v. Allwright. 321 U.S. 649, 665
(1944); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736-37 (1949). But see Smith v. Allwright. 321
U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (concern that Supreme Court overrule of its own
precedents "tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad
ticket, good for this day and train only").
The Court is more reluctant to overrule prior statutory constructions. Monell v. Department of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978); see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-92 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
13. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
14. Id. at 403. Detailed analyses of these and other policies supporting the doctrine of stare
decisis are found in E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW,
368-75 (1962); R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 39-83 (1961); H. Hart & A. Sacks. The
Legal Process 587-88 (1958) (mimeographed course materials published by Harvard Law School).
Among the numerous insightful commentaries on various aspects of stare decisis are: Green, The
Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should Be Applied. 40 ILL.
L. REV. 303 (1946); Hardisty, supra note 10; Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously.
39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979); Montrose, supra note 10; Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1 (1941); Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Piajudizienrecht in Amerika, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1933); Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1966).
15. Moragne, 398 U.S. 403-05.
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policies significantly threatened, the Court deemed it appropriate to over-
rule the precedent. 16
It is doubtful, however, that lower courts have authority to engage in a
similar analysis of Supreme Court precedent. The same basic policies that
favor a court following its own precedents also support the duty of lower
courts to follow the dictates of higher courts. 17 Yet lower courts are also
constrained by their subordinate position in the judicial system. The
American judicial hierarchy deprives lower courts of the right simply to
refuse to follow binding Supreme Court precedent. 18
II. IMPLICIT OVERRULE: AN OBLIGATION NOT TO FOLLOW
PRECEDENT
There are certain exceptions to the general mandate requiring lower
courts to follow Supreme Court precedent. For example, where the Su-
preme Court has overruled an on point precedent, lower courts must not
follow the precedent. Yet the Supreme Court does not always expressly
overrule precedents. Indeed, express overrule is relatively rare. 19 More
often the Court will distinguish the precedent, interpret it to mean some-
thing different, or simply ignore it.20 Thus, lower courts frequently find
themselves in the difficult position of determining whether the Supreme
16. The precedent was The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), which held that maritime law
provides no remedy for wrongful death. The Moragne Court found the Harrisburg rule anomalous in
light of modem widespread recognition of wrongful death actions. 398 U.S. at 404.
17. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
18. See Kelman, The Force of Precedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 3, 4 (1967)
("The doctrine can be stated simply: there is an absolute duty to apply the law as last pronounced by
superior judicial authority."). But see Green, supra note 14, at 319 n.73 ("if the [lower court] is
convinced that the former decision should be reconsidered [it] may refuse to follow it so as to give the
appellate court the opportunity to reconsider"); see also supra note I 1 (discussing lower court refusal
to follow "erroneous" Supreme Court precedent).
19. Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 VA. L. REv. 494, 511
(1974); see Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L. REv. 151,
152-59 (1958) (cataloguing various methods by which the Supreme Court overrules its precedents).
20. See Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 511 (C.D. Cal. 1968) ("But a [Supreme Court]
decision may be overruled simply by being bypassed and ignored, as well as by being denounced
specifically"), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 37 (1977). See also Llewellyn's "incomplete" list
of 64 ways to deal with precedent, K. LtLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 76-91 (1960).
The most frequently cited reason for the Supreme Court's failure to expressly overrule discredited
precedents is that frequent express overrulings damage the Court's credibility. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 19, at 515. Commentators are less quick to point out a similar damage to the Court's reputation
when it is less than forthright in its treatment of precedent. But see Douglas, supra note 12, at 749:
[I]t would be wise judicial administration when a landmark decision falls to overrule expressly
all cases in the same genus as the one which is repudiated, even though they are not before the
Court. There is candor in that course. Stare decisis then is not used to breed the uncertainty
which it is supposed to dispel.
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Court's past treatment of a precedent is a signal that the precedent is im-
plicitly overruled. 2 1
The question in implicit overrule is whether the Supreme Court has so
undermined the precedent in subsequent decisions that a lower court
should conclude that the precedent does not represent present doctrine. 22
As discussed, there are numerous means available to the Supreme Court
to undermine precedent without expressly overruling it. But the analysis
is essentially one of the sufficiency of the evidence. The Supreme Court
must display some minimum manifestation of disaffection before a lower
court can responsibly refuse to follow a precedent. 23
21. See. e.g., Gold v. DiCarlo. 235 F. Supp. 817. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affdmnem.. 380 U.S.
520 (1965). In Gold the three judge district court upheld an anti-ticket-scalping statute against a due
process challenge, despite the fact that the Supreme Court had declared the statute's predecessor
violative of substantive due process principles in Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
Although the Supreme Court had never expressly overruled Ty son. the district court noted that "'Ty-
son's fictional test was soon ... rejected in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 . . . (1934). " and
that the Supreme Court had continually refused to strike economic regulations under substantive due
process since Nebbia. 235 F. Supp. at 819. The court stated: "We would be abdicating our judicial
responsibility if we waited for the Supreme Court to use the express words 'We hereby overrule
Tyson' . . . before recognizing that the case is no longer binding precedent." Id.: see also Browder v
Gayle, 142 F. Supp 707. 715 (N.D. Ala.) (court found that Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
was implicitly overruled), affd men., 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
22. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility. 65 HARV. L. REV'. 1281. 1298
(1952). Commentators frequently speak of the "erosion" of precedent: a process of gradually distin-
guishing, ignoring, and discrediting a precedent until, at some point, the precedent becomes quite
clearly impotent. See, e.g.. Blaustein & Field, supra note 19. at 156-59. The authors note that in
such a process "it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the decision which results in the actual, practical
overruling." Id. at 157. Nevertheless, the impossibility of pointing to the decisive case does not
negate the possibility that the combination of a number of subsequent decisions can implicitly over-
rule a prior precedent, sometimes without even mentioning the precedent. See the discussion of Gold
v. DiCarlo, supra note 21.
23. Courts and commentators have suggested a full range of standards, usually without discus-
sion. See, e.g.. Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003. 1005
(2d Cir. 1970) ("near certainty"), cert. denied. 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); Mason v. United States. 461
F.2d 1364, 1375 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (lower court disregard permitted when precedent has been "seriously
weakened or eroded"), rev'd. 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Wyzanski. supra note 22. at 1298 ("reasonably
clear [the precedents] no longer represent the present doctrine"): Comment. Stare Decisis and the
Lower Courts: Two Recent Cases, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 504. 508 (1959) (rebuttable presumption of a
precedent's continued validity); 56 HARV. L. REV. 652, 653 (1943) (preponderance of the evidence):
Note, The Attitude of Lower Courts to Changing Precedent. 50 YALE L.J. 1448. 1455 (1941 (same).
At least one court has recognized the subjectivity of these general standards. In re Korman. 449
F.2d 32, 39 (7th Cir.) (disregard of precedent permitted "if we are convinced that it has been under-
mined"), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Korman, 406 U.S. 952 (1971). A few courts reject the
notion of implicit overrule and insist that the Supreme Court expressly overrule a precedent before
they decline to follow it. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 281 F.2d 225. 230 (7th Cir. 1960) (de-
claring precedent's vitality "extremely doubtful," but still considering the precedent as binding).
Although it is generally agreed that there must be some threshold of sufficiency for finding a pre-
cedent implicitly overruled, the more difficult question is divining the proper threshold. It seems.
however, that a "reasonable certainty" standard is appropriate. This standard is high enough to give
effect to the notion that the Supreme Court should make its intention to devitalize a precedent clear
and unequivocal. And the standard supports the notion that lower courts should have good reason to
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Implicit overrule is a useful doctrine. It allows for the incremental and
organic growth of the common law by recognizing that precedents can
slowly lose their authority without being expressly overruled. The doc-
trine requires lower courts to declare undermined precedent impotent, and
saves the Supreme Court from having to review cases to confirm the obvi-
ous. 24
The doctrine of implicit overrule has limited applicability, however.
Lower courts can only infer implicit overrule from Supreme Court dispo-
sitions that are capable of overruling a precedent by themselves. They
cannot infer implicit overrule from concurring or dissenting opinions, or
opinions attached to certiorari denials. 25 Thus, the court in McCray could
not refuse to follow Swain v. Alabama26 on the ground that Swain was
implicitly overruled, because statements in a certiorari denial were the
only basis for doubting that precedent's continued vitality.
McCray illustrates the limitations of the doctrine of implicit overrule,
and the need to expand lower courts' authority to disregard Supreme
Court precedent. Occasional cases arise where an authoritative precedent
confronts a lower court, but it is reasonably certain that the Supreme
Court would not follow the precedent. Within certain constraints, lower
courts should be permitted to disregard such precedent. The remainder of
this Comment will define the foundation for such action.
III. PREDICTION AS A BASIS FOR DISREGARDING SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT
In addition to implicit overrule, courts and commentators have dis-
cussed prediction of Supreme Court outcomes as a basis for disregarding
precedent. 27 Under this theory, a lower court need not follow a precedent
if it can predict that the Supreme Court would not follow the precedent.
disregard on point Supreme Court precedent. But the standard is not so high as to altogether eradicate
the possibility of an implicit overrule finding by a lower court.
24. See Note, supra note 12, at 501 ("[W]hen it appears to a certainty that subsequent Supreme
Court decisions in an area have rendered a precedent obsolete, so that the precedent serves only to
confuse unwary litigants or judges, a lower court can perform a service by formal disavowal.").
25. See, H. BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS, 131-32 (1912); Linzer, The Meaning of Cer-
tiorariDenials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1304 (1979).
26. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
27. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 814-15, (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom.
Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); 139 F.2d at 823 (Hand, J., dissenting)
(lower court "duty is to divine, as best it can, what would be the event of an appeal"); United States
v. Girourard, 149 F.2d 760, 765 (1st Cir. 1945), (Woodbury, J., dissenting) ("duty to prophesy")
rev'd, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984
(1976); see also Comment, supra note 23; Comment, 37 B.U.L. REv. 137 (1957); 56 HARV. L. REv.
652 (1943); Note, The Attitude of Lower Courts, supra note 23. But see, e.g., Mans v. Sunray DX
Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (N.D. Okla. 1971) ("This court is disposed to follow the pro-
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In one sense these two approaches, implicit overrule and prediction,
are merely two ways of arriving at the same conclusion: the current status
of a Supreme Court precedent. Both require lower courts to examine evi-
dence pertaining to the Supreme Court's view of the precedent's contin-
ued vitality. Further, as with implicit overrule, a lower court cannot re-
fuse to follow a Supreme Court precedent on predictive grounds unless it
is reasonably certain that the Supreme Court would not follow the pre-
cedent. 28 Thus, in many cases it makes little difference whether a lower
court disregards precedent because it is implicitly overruled, or because
predictably the Supreme Court would not follow it. The result is the
same.
Yet, in other cases the difference between implicit overrule and predic-
tion are readily apparent. For instance, lower courts may confront a pre-
cedent predictably impotent yet not implicitly overruled. McCrav v.
Abrams29 is one example. At the time of the McCray decision, the Su-
preme Court had never decided a case inconsistent with its holding in
Swain. Yet there were persuasive grounds for believing that the Supreme
Court would not follow Swain again. With five Justices questioning the
vitality of Swain in opinions attached to a certiorari denial, 30 the court in
McCray could predict with some certainty that the Supreme Court would
no longer follow Swain.31
nouncements of the Supreme Court. not predict them."): Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniels.
79 F. Supp. 62, 69 (E.D.S.C. 1948) ("It is not our duty to speculate on what the Supreme Court as
now constituted may do on an appeal in this case"), rei'd. 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
28. The proper sufficiency threshold is the subject of debate in the prediction context, as well as
the implicit overrule context. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Some courts recognize their
power to predict Supreme Court refusal to follow a precedent, but find the basis for prediction in the
particular case too weak. E.g.. Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6 ( Ist Cir.). Cert. denied. 429 U.S. 984
(1976); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), rev'd. 406 U.S. 952 (1971).
29. 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). For a summary of McCray, see supra notes 1-9 and
accompanying text.
30. Justice Stevens' concurrence in the McCray certiorari denial. 103 S. Ct. 2438. did not ex-
plicitly condemn Swain. But there is a strong inference that Justice Stevens and the two Justices
joining him were dissatisfied with Sivain. given their express willingness to reconsider the issue. See
supra note 8; see also the discussion of Justice Stevens' concurrence in The Supreme Court. 1982
Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 193-97 (1983).
31. Certiorari denials, and opinions attached thereto, cannot overrule precedents because such
denials are wholly without authoritative value. Brown v. Allen. 344 U.S. 443. 488-513 (1952)
(opinion of Frankfurter. J.): see Linzer, supra note 19. at 1251-55. Indeed, Justice Stevens. author of
the concurrence to the denial of certiorari in McCray. has characterized opinions attached to certiorari
denials as "the purest form of dicta." Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940, 945 (1978).
The court in McCray did not purport to predict the demise of Swain: rather. it accepted an "invita-
tion" to reconsider the issue. 576 F. Supp. at 1246. However. as the court recognized. the invitation
theory is dubious in the McCrav case even if persuasive generally. Any invitation to lower courts to
reconsider Swain "was perhaps not intended to apply to a collateral attack on the very conviction the
Court was addressing." Id. Further, it is doubtful that the district court would have considered itself
authorized to repudiate Swain. in spite of the invitation, were that precedent's demise not predictable.
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McCray presents a situation where prediction is valid as a basis for
disregarding Supreme Court precedent. Still, some commentators have
derided lower court prediction of Supreme Court outcomes as an affront
to judicial propriety, both because of the nature of the data upon which
predictions are based, and because of the form of predictive reasoning.
These objections suggest that there are only narrow circumstances in
which prediction is valid. But, as circumscribed by considerations of ju-
dicial propriety, prediction is a valid and useful device for lower courts
dealing with precedent. 32
A. Limiting Admissible Predictive Data
The first objective to prediction is that use of much of the relevant data
offends judicial propriety. Logically, relevant predictive data include
anything probative of the Supreme Court's disposition toward the pre-
cedent, not just subsequent decisions, as with implicit overrule. Such a
broad scope of relevant data introduces elements unaccustomed and inim-
ical to judicial reasoning. As one court feared, prediction that considers
all probative evidence could "subvert the salutary doctrine of stare de-
cisis into a study of personalities.' ,33
But prediction per se is not offensive. Rather it is the kinds of data
relevant to the prediction that offend. Factors such as changes in Court
personnel or the personal ideologies of the Justices are relevant and some-
times reliable indications of the Supreme Court's probable disposition of
an issue. For example, a lower court might confidently predict the demise
of a precedent if Justices who prior to their appointments publicly
Finally, the fact that the court in McCray did not actually predict is not important. The important fact
is that McCray serves as a fine example of a circumstance where an on point precedent is not impli-
citly overruled but is predictably impotent.
32. Lower court authority to predict the demise of Supreme Court precedent is permissive, in-
stead of mandatory, because it would be anamolous to find lower courts legally bound to disregard a
precedent which the Supreme Court has not overruled. Compare the implicit overrule situation where
the duty to disregard the precedent is unquestionably mandatory.
33. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 79 F. Supp. 62, 68 (E.D.S.C. 1948), rev'd, 336 U.S.
220 (1949). Lower courts have been particularly averse to predicting Supreme Court outcomes on the
basis of changes in Court personnel, or intimations of the Justices' personal beliefs. See, e.g., United
States v. Silverman, 166 F. Supp. 838, 840 (D.D.C. 1958) ("It would not do, as counsel suggests,
for the Court to speculate on what at some future time the Supreme Court might decide in the light of
changes of personnel, and in the light of various remarks of individual members of the Court"),
aff'd, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); United States v. Swift & Co., 189
F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Ill. 1960) ("We are not free to... speculate upon probabilities or personal-
ities."), affd, 367 U.S. 909 (1961); Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 300 F. Supp. 281,
291 (E.D. Pa.) ("[I]t is not this Court's function to predict reversals of Supreme Court decisions
based upon changes in personnel of the Court."), modified, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969); see also
United States v. Cincotta, 146 F. Supp. 61, 62 (N.D.N.Y. 1956) (refusal to predict on basis of a
dissenting opinion).
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opposed the precedent joined a closely divided Supreme Court. 3 4 But per-
sonal ideologies or extra-judicial intimations of Justices' legal views,
while valuable as predictive aids, are not acceptable reasons for reaching
a legal result.
Prediction is a legitimate basis for refusing to follow precedent, but
only if the data is amenable to judicial decisionmaking and includable in
judicial opinions. 35 The courts must narrow the field of admissible data
beyond the constraints of relevance and reliability, so that considerations
not customarily part of judicial decisionmaking do not become reasons
for disregarding precedent. Justices' personalities, extra-judicial utter-
ances, and other subjective factors may be relevant and reliable. But
lower courts should not apply these factors because reference to them vi-
olates the concept that law is separate from the judges who declare it.36
34. This seems to be what happened in Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer. 108 Ariz. 508. 502
P.2d 1327 (1973). In Roofing Wholesale. the Arizona Supreme Court refused to follow Fuentes v.
Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972), a four-to-three decision holding that due process requires a hearing prior
to pre-judgment attachment of property. The Arizona court had "doubts" that Fuentes would stand
"when the two judges who did not participate in the particular case IJustices Rehnquist and Powell.
both newly appointed] are called up to participate in a similar question." 502 P.2d at 1329. Appar-
ently. knowledge of the ideological positions of the newly appointed Justices led the court to believe
that the Fuentes issue would be decided the other way next time.
Roofing Wholesale is noted and criticized in 86 HARV. L. REV. 1307. 1309 (1973) (criticizing "the
implicit assumption that it was proper for the Arizona court to speculate about the views of the two
nonparticipating Justices"): see Kelman, supra note 18. at 10 ("And certainly it is not within the
compass of the lower courts to disregard authoritative cases on the basis merely of recent substitu-
tions of personnel on the high bench, even when the smart money bets that a change in the law is
imminent. "). But see Note, The Attitude of Lower Courts, supra note 23. at 1455 (regarding Justices'
"personal philosophies" as validly considered by lower courts in determining whether to disregard a
precedent).
35. See Monaghan. supra note 14, at 25 ("A Justice who initially reached a decision on the basis
of factors he is unwilling to assert publicly as a justification is, to my mind, under a duty to reconsider
his decision with the impermissible factors excluded so far as is humanly possible.").
Some commentators maintain that judges need not disclose the true basis of their decisions if such
would reflect adversely on the judicial process. See, e.g., Spruill. The Effect of an Overruling Deci-
sion, 18 N.C.L. REV. 199, 203 (1940) (agreeing with realists that judges "make" law but approving
of judicial opinions which purport to "discover" law because of the public's need to believe in an
objective legal reality: "We should worry less about the people who demand that they be fooled and
more about the part of the bench and bar which fools itself."). It seems, however, that if judicial
"integrity" is to denote more than a mask donned by a cynical legal profession to beguile a naive
public, judges are obliged to be candid about their reasons for decisions. To the argument that the
court should not express some reasons because the public would not accept them. the short answer is
that the courts should not consider such reasons at all. overtly or covertly.
36. But see Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer. 108 Ariz. 508, 502 P.2d 1327 (1973) (discussed
at supra note 34). Cf. Barnette v. West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.W. Va.
1942), affd. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette the district court held. in direct opposition to a two-
year-old Supreme Court precedent, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). that a
state regulation requiring compulsory flag salutes in public schools was an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of religious liberty. Gobitis was decided by an eight-to-one majority, but before the Barnette
case arose two members of the Gobitis majority retired and three others, dissenting in Jones v. Opel-
ika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). confessed that they had erred in Gobitis.
Stare Decisis in Lower Courts
Although an attorney might rely on these factors as impetus to pursue a
case through the appellate hierarchy, no lower court should base its deci-
sion on such considerations.
In cases like McCray, however, where the basis of prediction derives
from statements of Justices made in their judicial capacities, the predic-
tive data are more appropriately included in lower courts' reasoning. Of
course dicta such as opinions attached to certiorari denials, concurring
and dissenting opinions, or statements not necessary to the holding in ma-
jority opinions, generally cannot overrule a precedent. 37 But while dicta
seldom overrule a precedent, they are not improper elements in lower
courts' reasoning processes. Indeed, where there is no holding directly on
point, many lower courts consider themselves bound by Supreme Court
dicta, 38 and probably all assign it some weight.
Limiting admissible predictive data to Justices' judicial pronounce-
ments answers the first objection to prediction. Lower courts exclude data
offensive to judicial reasoning. Yet, the scope of admissible data is con-
siderably broader than that relevant to determining whether a precedent is
implicitly overruled. Under prediction, a lower court may refuse to fol-
low a precedent if it is reasonably certain on the basis of Justices' judicial
pronouncements that the Supreme Court will no longer follow the pre-
cedent, regardless of whether the precedent is expressly or implicitly
overruled.
B. Head-counting: The Form of Predictive Reasoning
The second objection to prediction is that it is inappropriate because of
the form of reasoning involved. Some commentators contend that
Thus, it was clear when Barnette was decided that at least four Justices would not follow Gobitis; the
positions of the two new Justices apparently were not known. The court in Barnette stated:
[W]e feel that we would be recreant to our duty as judges, if through a blind following of a
decision which the Supreme Court itself has thus impaired as an authority, we should deny
protection to rights which we regard as among the most sacred of those protected by constitu-
tional guarantees.
47 F. Supp. at 253. Barnette, like McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), see
supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text, is a good example of a lower court confronted by an on
point and unoverruled precedent which may be predictably impotent. Barnette is discussed in 56
HARV. L. REv. 652 (1943).
37. H. BLACK, supra note 25, § 57. An interesting exploration of the concept of dicta is found in
Montrose, supra note 14, at 325-29.
38. E.g., United States v. Kahn, 251 F. Supp. 702, 708 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); Central La. Elec. Co.
v. Rural Electrification Admin., 236 F. Supp. 271, 277 n.10 (W.D. La. 1964), rev'd, 354 F.2d 859,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966); see also United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975).
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prediction entails "head-counting," 39 a form of reasoning they believe is
inconsistent with the legal analysis expected of lower courts. 40
Head-counting is cataloguing individual Justices' known views on an
issue to determine whether a majority agrees on the issue's resolution. It
is an intuitively obvious method of predicting Supreme Court outcomes.
If five or more incumbent Justices have recently expressed disagreement
with a precedent, the next time the issue reaches the Court it is reasonably
certain that the law will change. 41 This is the form of reasoning the court
in McCray used. Noting five Justices' dissatisfaction with Swain, the
court relied on the willingness of five Justices to reconsider the Swain
decision42 as permission to stray from the precedent. 43
The major objection to head-counting is the heavy emphasis on the po-
sitions of individual Justices.44 Head-counting departs considerably from
the traditional school of interpreting law-a school that envisions lower
courts abstracting rules from majority opinions. Lower courts cannot al-
ways apply the traditional method, however, because with increasing
39. See, e.g., Note, supra note 19, at 537; Comment, supra note 23. at 509.
40. Aside from the traditional duty of judges to give reasons for their decisions, an important
function of lower courts is providing the appellate court with a helpful legal analysis. See Kelman,
supra note 18, at 11; see also Wyzanski, supra note 22, at 1299. Lower courts that justify their
decisions solely on the basis of "head-counting" appellate judges do little to enlighten the appellate
courts on the legal issues.
41. It may be necessary for the statements to be recent and for the Justices to be incumbent to
make the prediction with reasonable certainty. See generally supra note 28 and accompanying text.
42. 576 F. Supp. at 1246.
43. For other examples of head-counting as a method for predicting the demise of Supreme Court
precedent, see Barnette v. West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W.Va. 1942)
(discussed at supra note 36), affd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Maxfield v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.
Co., 8 Utah 2d 183, 330 P.2d 1018 (1958). At issue in Maxfield was the quantum of proof required of
a plaintiff attacking a release under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982). In
Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 U.S. 625 (1948), the Court had employed a high quantum. But in
its examination of various opinions subsequent to Callen, the court in Maxfield determined that "at
least six of the Justices were opposed to requiring the employee to meet the highest burden of proof."
330 P.2d at 1020. Maxfield is discussed in 8 KAN. L. REV. 165 (1959).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 166 F. Supp. 838, 840 (D.D.C. 1958) ("It would not
do, as counsel suggests, for the Court to speculate on what at some future time the Supreme Court
might decide in the light of . . .various remarks of individual members of the Court in different
cases. This exercise might be interesting for the author of an article in a legal periodical, but it would
be inappropriate for a Court in deciding actual controversies."), affd, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir.
1960), rev'd, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
Commentators have not articulated this objection to head-counting, instead they usually object to
the practice because it is unreliable. Comment, supra note 23, at 509. Head-counting is not, how-
ever, inherently unreliable. Of course lower courts must possess a minimum amount of evidence to
validly predict the demise of a precedent, see supra note 28 and accompanying text, but there is no
reason to believe that evidence obtained through head-counting can never meet the sufficiency thresh-
old.
Stare Decisis in Lower Courts
frequency the Supreme Court fails to present a majority opinion. 45 Very
often, for example, the only way to determine the holding in a plurality
decision is to head-count. 46
Until the Supreme Court begins to manifest greater unity in its deci-
sions, head-counting will continue to be a practical and necessary form of
judicial reasoning. Discordant Supreme Court voices also validate the use
of head-counting for prediction. The form is no more offensive in the
prediction context than it is in contexts where its use is already ac-
cepted. 47
C. The Utility of Limited Prediction
So long as lower courts base predictions upon a high standard of suffi-
cient evidence, and limit the predictive data to statements found in Su-
preme Court writings, the integrity of judicial decisionmaking seems
safe. The final issue then is whether predicting Supreme Court outcomes
serves to improve the lower courts' decisionmaking process.
Lower courts' power to predict the demise of Supreme Court precedent
serves at least two purposes. The first is judicial efficiency. Where a
lower court knows that the Supreme Court will not follow a precedent,
the lower court may save costly appeals by ruling contrary to the pre-
cedent. The second purpose is fairness. If a precedent is predictably im-
potent, it is overly formalistic to deprive a litigant of a result in lower
court because the Supreme Court has not yet done what it predictably will
do. 48
Efficiency and fairness are not always served by prediction, however.
45. Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
756,756 (1980).
46. Head-counting is an accepted method for interpreting plurality decisions. See Note, supra
note 45, at 761. The Supreme Court itself head-counts to interpret its plurality precedents. See, e.g.,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (interpreting Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
47. Lower court decisions in contravention of predictably impotent precedent should not rely
solely on the head-count. The court's opinion should also contain an analysis of the substantive is-
sues. See supra note 40; see also McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1246-49 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). But the head-count renders permissible a legal analysis that is otherwise foreclosed by the
precedent.
48. Efficiency and fairness are among the most frequently cited reasons for general adherence to
the doctrine of stare decisis. See, e.g., Hart & Sacks, supra note 14, at 587-88; Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). It is important to recognize that the application of these
factors to lower court predictions of the Supreme Court is not purely coincidental. Prediction is not
inconsistent with the traditionally conceived stare decisis relationship of lower courts to higher
courts. Lower courts that decline to follow precedent on predictive grounds are still following the
higher court. Instead of following a particular case, however, they are following a trend or a ten-
dency.
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Where predicting a precedent's demise is likely to stir great controversy,
the Supreme Court should, and probably will, settle the point. Prediction
may threaten rather than serve judicial efficiency in this situation, because
lower courts are likely to disagree and unsettle law that was once clear. 49
Similarly, where litigants act in reliance on a precedent, prediction may
not effectuate fairness. Thus, the propriety of prediction depends on the
particular circumstances of a case. But when prediction effectuates fair-
ness, efficiency, or some other judicially cognizable value, there is no
reason why lower courts should not disregard predictably impotent pre-
cedent.5 0
IV. CONCLUSION
Lower courts serve a valuable function by refusing to follow on point
precedents in appropriate circumstances. While they cannot overrule Su-
preme Court precedent, lower courts can help clarify the law by determin-
ing that the Supreme Court has implicitly overruled a precedent. But this
lower court authority to disregard precedent should not be limited to the
implicit overrule context. Occasionally, lower courts confront precedents
that are not implicitly overruled, but that the Supreme Court predictably
would not follow. In such circumstances, and where prediction would not
exceed the bounds of judicial propriety, lower court authority to disregard
predictably impotent precedent should be recognized as a valid and valu-
able characteristic of the legal system.
David C. Bratz
49. The point is made in Note, supra note 19, at 520: "If there is reason to believe that disavowal
will not be convincing to other lower courts-if it is likely that the Supreme Court must take a similar
case on appeal ultimately to resolve the issue-disavowal serves no useful purpose."
50. Even where a lower court decides to follow the precedent rather than the prediction, the
lower court is always free to state its objections to the precedent in its opinion. See Wyzankski, supra
note 22, at 1299 ("Where the precedent has not been impaired, the balance is in favor of the trial
judge following it in his decree and respectfully stating in his accompanying opinion such reserva-
tions as he has.").
For a recent example of a lower court following but criticizing a precedent in the peremptory
challenge context, see the en banc decision of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Childress, 715
F.2d 1313 (1983) (criticizing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), but failing to predict its
demise), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 744 (1984).
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